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This article is a radical restatement of the predominant psychopathology, which is
characterized by nosological systems and by its approach towards a neurobiological
conception of the so-called mental disorders. The “radical” sense of this restatement is
that of radical behaviorism itself. As readers will recall, “radical” applied to behaviorism
means total (not ignoring anything that interests psychology), pragmatic (referring to the
practical sense of knowledge), and it also derives from the Latin word for “root” (and thus
implies change beginning at a system’s roots or getting to the root of things, in this case,
of psychological disorders). Based on this, I introduce the Aristotelian distinction of material
and form, which, besides being behaviorist avant la lettre, is used here as a critical instrument
to unmask the hoax of psychopathology as it is presented. The implications of this
restatement are discussed, some of them already prepared for clinical practice.
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Se hace un replanteamiento radical de la psicopatología dominante, caracterizada por
los sistemas nosológicos y por su abocamiento a una concepción neurobiológica de los
llamados trastornos mentales. El sentido ‘radical’ de este replanteamiento no es otro
que el propio del conductismo radical. Como se recordará, ‘radical’ aplicado al
conductismo quiere decir total (sin dejar de estudiar nada que interese a la psicología),
pragmático (referido al sentido práctico del conocimiento) y de raíz (yendo a la raíz de
las cosas, en este caso de los trastornos psicológicos). Sobre esta base, se introduce
la distinción aristotélica de materia y forma que, además de ser conductista avant la
lettre, sirve aquí de instrumento crítico para desenmascarar el tinglado de la psicopatología
según está dado. Se señalan las implicaciones de este replanteamiento, algunas prestas
ya para la práctica clínica.
Palabras clave: causas aristotélicas, conductismo radical, problemas de la vida, psy-
complex, trastornos psicológicos, sistema nosológico
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When I began to develop the proposed title
“Psychopathology according to behaviorism,” I had two
options. According to one, I could take the field of
psychopathology in its natural state, apart from theories and
clinical procedures, to examine it according to behaviorism.
In line with the other option, I could take it as it is, with
all its current conceptions and practices, and then disclose
how behaviorism sees it, at least a behaviorism especially
interested in cultural practices, as will be performed herein. 
However, at second glance, I realized that only the
second option is possible, that is, there is no option because
there is no natural psychopathology, apart from culture,
including clinical culture. The clinical culture I refer to is
a complex of social conceptions and practices that mediate
the entire reality of psychopathology. Therefore, the given
reality is a framework or psy-complex that already comprises
the “natural state” of psychopathology. What is this
framework? We will examine it below but first, let me say
a few words about the behaviorism from whence we shall
look at this framework. 
About Behaviorism
I refer to Skinner’s radical behaviorism. It will not be
necessary to highlight radical behaviorism compared to the
existing variety of behaviorisms (O’Donohue & Kitchener,
1999; Pérez-Álvarez, 2004). In fact, the reader can consult
in this issue the article by Fuentes (2004), as well as the
one by Fuentes and Quiroga (2004). In any case, in this
article, I will comment upon three aspects of the meaning
of “radical,” as applied to behaviorism, which are relevant
to this work, simply because it is a radical restatement, in
this case, of psychopathology. 
First, “radical” has the meaning of “total,” referring here
to the fact that radical behaviorism studies everything that
is part of the field of psychology, including the “subjective
experience” and the so-called “inner world,” just to mention
a few topics that dodge the scientific method. But Skinner’s
behaviorism does not leave anything out because of method,
as does, conversely, methodological behaviorism. In fact,
methodological behaviorism, whose most important
representative nowadays is cognitive psychology (Moore,
1995), rejects subjective contents because they are not
directly observable, readmitting them as hypothetical
constructs. These constructs, which are normally presented
as supposed cognitive structures and processes, are accessible
through behavior, hence, this cognitive psychology is
anchored in methodological behaviorism (despite the fact
that it does not acknowledge itself under this term). 
However, subjective contents are observable, with the
peculiarity that they are only observable for one person, the
interested party. Therefore, the question is how can a person
observe a part of the world that is only there for him or
her? The question is, how can people learn to have the “inner
world” that they do have and to express their subjective
experience, or, vice versa, how does society manage to make
this happen? To this respect, Skinner formulated the
principles of social learning of the “inner world” and the
“subjective experience” in his classic work (Skinner,
1945/1988). Along these lines, the social verbal context of
the new acceptance and commitment therapy is a
specification of special clinical interest (Hayes, Strosahl, &
Wilson, 1999). Doubtless, the radical behaviorism perspective
is privileged to know what I mean when I talk about the
inner world, which is crucial in psychopathology. 
Second, “radical” also has a “pragmatic” meaning,
referring to the practical sense that comprises or should
comprise scientific knowledge, in this case, of human
behavior. This pragmatism concerns both the destination of
knowledge (useful to solve life’s practical problems) and
its genesis, relative to the essentially practical-operatory
character of scientific action rather than to its mental or
theoreticist (propositional) character. In this respect, radical
behaviorism is opposed to the hypothetical-deductive system,
which seems more concerned with inventing constructs than
with solving problems. This scientific logic, consisting of
inventing constructs, is frequently used in psychopathology,
where hypothetical (diagnostic) categories are more abundant
than causal (etiological) knowledge (Pérez-Álvarez, 2003;
van Praag, 1997).
Third, “radical” still has the etymological sense of “root,”
referring to the origin of things. Of course, it all depends
on where these roots are or, actually, where you look for
them because in psychology, wherever you look, you will
find (that is how “responsive” an “enthusiastic” search can
be). Radical behaviorism seeks the roots of behavior in the
environment. With regard to this, environment is specified
according to certain conditions called “reinforcement
contingencies” and rules or norms that define how the world
functions. The relevant point is that the root of behavior is
found in certain specifiable environmental conditions, whose
specification is performed by means of functional analysis
of behavior. Although the usual term is “environment,” it
would be better to use the word “context,” “culture,” or
even, “world.”
The decisive importance of a radical perspective oriented
towards the context (the culture, or the world of life), such
as that of behaviorism, can be seen in the relation with other
alternatives, that are oriented to the individual’s inner world
(as, to be sure, are most perspectives in psychopathology).
The nature of one of these alternatives is neurobiological.
Its radical difference from a contextual orientation can be
formulated in the following statement: Whereas the
neurobiological viewpoint seeks the roots of a disorder in
the world of biology, the contextual orientation looks for
them in the world of life. Another alternative is of a mental
nature, either the mind of psychoanalysis (in the form of a
psychic apparatus) or the mind of cognitive psychology (in
the form of a processing system). Radical behaviorism does
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not focus on this kind of inner world, because it considers
that people are inside the world, not that the world is inside
people. In any case, ahead of my world is the world.
Therefore, the root of disorders would be found in the world
of life, where people’s lives are made and undone. And as
behavior is what the person does and what makes a person,
radical behaviorism’s privileged perspective of
psychopathology becomes clear. 
The Framework of Psychopathology
Briefly, the framework of psychopathology is
characterized by the classificatory systems and the
neurobiological conception. The trouble with classificatory
systems—represented by the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM hereafter) of the
American Psychiatric Association, especially since the 1980
edition; the last edition dating from 2000 (American
Psychiatric Association, 1980; 2000)—is that nosological
descriptions are not the natural entities they seem to be. Far
from being natural kinds, they are practical kinds (Zachar,
2001, 2003). The diagnostic categories as “practical kinds”
are useful both for the patients (to have something nameable)
and for the clinicians (to endow them with some assumed
knowledge).
In fact, classificatory systems serve several other interests,
rather than that of supposed scientific knowledge. Among
these interests are the legitimization of psychiatry as a
medical specialty, billing third-party payers (for example,
insurance companies) for health services, and the promotion
of drugs (Horwitz, 2002). One could also add the patients’
legitimization provided by the illness. Thus, for example,
the patients not only accept the notion of illness (diagnosis)
with good grace, they even vindicate it (McLean, 1991;
Fukuyama, 2002, chap. 3).
Alternatively, the problem of the neurobiological
conception is that science is not completely sure about the
presumed biological causes of any psychiatric disorder. There
are a number of biological factors that may be related in
one way or another with various disorders, but that does
not make them causes. Instead, they may even be
consequences of the disorder. Surely, what characterizes
psychiatry is that the diagnostic proliferation is out of phase
with etiological knowledge. In fact, the current state of
psychiatric diagnosis does not meet the prerequisites of
neurobiological research (van Praag, 1997).
The fact that some drugs relieve certain disorders does
not prove that the cause of the disorder is the “mechanism”
modified by the drug. However, defining a disorder by the
effects of a pharmaceutical product has become a
psychopharmacological research strategy, known as “listening
to drugs,” on account of the famous book by Kramen (1993),
Listening to Prozac. What this strategy of  “listening to
drugs” reveals is that, the pharmacological solution, rather
than the patient, prevails over the psychological problem.
One of the consequences of this strategy is that depression
has become epidemic (Pignarre, 2002).
Another troublesome consequence of the neurobiological
conception is that it leads to concealing the social causes
and psychological solutions of disorders that are actually
psychosocial (and not “mental illnesses”). With regard to
this, it is noteworthy that there are psychological treatments
for every disorder, which are at least as efficient as
medication and, at any rate, homogeneous with the
psychosocial nature of the disorder (Pérez-Álvarez,
Fernández-Hermida, Fernández-Rodríguez, & Amigo-
Vázquez, 2003). Although it has already been pointed out
that people tend to stick to the conception of illness (under
the auspices of the pharmaceutical industry), it is also true
that many patients/clients search for psychological solutions.
In this sense, the people are divided and, perhaps, caught
up between the pill and the word, to thus identify,
respectively, the psychiatric and psychological “solution.” 
In view of the above, one could ask in whose hands is
psychopathology? The answer is obvious. Psychopathology
is in the hands of the designers of the DMS and the
manufacturers of drugs. The DMS classificatory system,
like a Bible, and the pharmaceutical industry, like a Church,
organize the framework of psychopathology. In fact, if this
is the way things are, one would have to conclude that
psychopathology does not even exist. One cannot expect
much from clinical psychology either, to the extent that it
has also succumbed to the classificatory systems and is, in
any case, a tower of Babel, because of the variety of current
schools. Nevertheless, it will still have a critical
reconstructive role here (Pérez-Álvarez, 1998).
A Radical Restatement
With things being the way they are, a radical restatement
is necessary. In this instance, radical means total, pragmatic,
and root. For the proposed restatement, it is necessary to
introduce the pair of terms material/form. These terms are
not foreign to the field of psychopathology, although their
most frequent version is form/content (Berrios, 1996, p. 20),
form understood in the Kantian sense. However, in this
work, I shall maintain the original Aristotelian schema of
material/form. In fact, I will end up using Aristotle’s four
causes, that is, the material cause—what are psychological
disorders made of?—, the formal cause—what form do they
adopt?—, the efficient cause—who makes them that way?—,
and the final cause—what end can they have?— (Pérez-
Álvarez, 2003).
What are Psychological Disorders Made of?
As could be expected, the material cause points to the
material of psychological disorders (psychiatric or mental,
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at this point, it is irrelevant). The question is what are
psychological disorders made of? The answer is essential
to consolidate psychopathology. It is not the same if disorders
are, for example, made of “imbalances in neurotransmitters,”
“unconscious conflicts,” “abnormal experiences,” “cognitive
dysfunctions,” “problematic behaviors,” “existential worries,”
or “pathological communications,” to name just a few of
the possible answers according to different clinical
approaches.
With regard to this study, in the viewpoint of radical
behaviorism, the answer would point to life’s problems and
the behaviors that constitute an attempt to solve them. To
begin with, it should be stated that life itself is a problem.
On this background are situated many problems, which reach
a critical threshold and so, have their own figure. In
particular, as will be seen below, there is a special tendency
in modern society for the problems that achieve some figure
or personal meaning to take on the form of “psychological
problems.” But the background they come from and the
content they are made of are those of life’s problems. These
life’s problems are none other than conflicts, frustrations,
disillusions, and changes, all susceptible to analysis in terms
of reinforcement contingencies. 
Thus, there may be conflict between different reinforcement
programs that are incompatible, such as, for example, two
systems of life, or the same thing that is simultaneously an
immediate positive reinforcer and a long-term negative one.
Herein are also included conflicts between norms or cultural
rules that govern (and ungovern) people’s lives, for example,
between dependence and independence, security and freedom,
having a personal identity or following the fashion of the day.
I refer to contradictory norms, which are probably subjacent
to various disorders such as, for example, anorexia and
agoraphobia, although current clinical practices ignore their
implications. The concerned conflicts would consist of the
entire modern ‘psychomachia’, due to the plurality of options
of life itself. 
Frustrations are circumstances that prevent one from
achieving some possible but often improbable reinforcers.
With regard to this, readers are reminded that the consumer
society is founded on dis-satisfaction. The various reactions
to frustration can become an object of concern, so that they
become the center of a person’s life, even to the point of
draining it. Doubtless, a “frustrated life” can easily provide
material for various disorders, in which anxiety and
depression may not be lacking. 
Disillusions imply the loss of the reinforcing value of
something that was maintaining the behavior designed to
achieve the reinforcement. This refers to life events that are
sufficiently important to become a problem that can turn
into a clinical problem. How often has one’s life depended
on something—a family, a job, a friendship— only to see
this source of reinforcers lose its value?
Finally, changes refer here to transitions from one
contingency system to another. A contingency system
involves practically the entire organization of an individual’s
life, so that a change can upset and alter the person’s whole
life. In our society, adolescence and retirement constitute
situations that are very characteristic of this type of change.
One could add disasters, and these transitions of
contemporary society are doubtless somewhat disastrous. It
is noteworthy how prone adolescence is to certain disorders
such as depression, anorexia and schizophrenia. 
Thus, for radical behaviorism, the material of
psychological disorders is found in life contingencies.
However, as contingencies are always related to people’s
behavior, and are, in fact, defined by behavior itself, the
material of disorders obviously includes behavior. Moreover,
the material is behavior, which incorporates the conditions
due to the mutual interdependence of behavior-contingency.
Indeed, whether or not contingencies as situations or life
conditions will constitute a problem will depend on behavior,
to the same extent that behavior adapts to the environment
and, at the same time, it adapts the environment to behavior
itself. Behavior is action, praxis and, in this sense, it is more
or less practical or functional to address the contingencies
of life. 
Behavior, then, is what people do to function in life and,
at the same time, it is what makes them persons throughout
their lives. Therefore, behavior (continuous action and
accumulated deeds) could easily be called drama. Ultimately,
“drama” means action and plays, and what could be more
of a drama than life itself? Along this line, it would be
tempting to use the theater as an image of life. Aside from
the notion of drama as action or behavior, the very person
is a notion originating in the theater. On the other hand, the
notion of the world as a scenario and the norms as scripts
is not hard to accept. Psychological disorders would thus
reach a relatively new perspective. In this sense, disorders
would have a bit of drama, in particular, of more or less
dramatic dramas, from tragedies—when life turns into a
“catastrophe” (by the way, a term originating in the
theater)—to psychodramas—when life’s normal problems
are psychologically or psychiatrically dramatized (as is the
normalized way in current society). Definitely, the material
of psychological disorders is made up of life’s dramas, if I
may reformulate in these terms the contingencies and
behaviors I started out with (Pérez-Álvarez, 2004, chap. 9).
What Form do Psychological Disorders Adopt?
The question about the form is inseparable from the
question about the material. That said, the question would
be which form do life’s dramas take on, or, you prefer the
initial sobriety, what form do life’s problems adopt? Briefly,
the form would be no other than the known clinical form
consisting of the nosological descriptions. This is a clinical
form made to the image of the medical model. Moreover,
this clinical form is the normal form, scarcely questioned
and practically a given fact. 
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In order to see the sense of this question, it must be
taken into account that every society has its models of
“incorrect behavior.” It is as though society said, “Don’t get
this problem but if you do have it, then have it this way”
(Linton, 1936/1972, p. 417 of the Spanish edition). In effect,
culture offers “model symptoms that, allowing the
exteriorization of disorders under standardized forms, makes
them more easily controllable” (Devereux, 1970/1972, p.
70 of the Spanish edition).
Well then, the clinical descriptions in accordance with
the classificatory systems are the normalized forms that
people’s problems adopt in modern society. In other words,
the clinical descriptions are the ways of psycho-dramatizing
life’s dramas. As the clinical form is so normalized, it is
difficult to conceive of things being any different. What
other form could psychological disorders adopt? If one
ponders on the limit of the conceivable, one could say the
following: 
Some “disorders” might not adopt any particular clinical
form, so that if they do have a form, it would be because
of the tendency to pathologize normal situations. In that
case, these situations would not even reach the threshold of
problems. Other “disorders” would just be life’s normal
problems if people assumed that “that’s the way life is,” a
problem unto itself. Other disorders could be assigned to
misfortune or life contingency. What has happened is that
traditional misfortune has been secularized as a risk and the
“risk culture” is ready to ponder on the imponderable,
problematizing what would otherwise be just un-fortunate
events. On the other hand, problems that “upset” life beyond
the former consideration could have religious treatment, as
in times that were dominated by the Church, or they could
have philosophical treatment, in this case, in accordance
with practical philosophies of life. 
The reference to “religious treatment” is not exactly meant
to vindicate it here, but it can be used as counterbalance
when mulling over and thinking about current clinical
dominance. In this sense, one would see that the Church has
been substituted by the Hospital as the totalizing institutions
of life’s order and disorders. The health cult would be the
new religion. We would be left doubting whether the original
sin is stress, trauma, or low self-esteem, but from there on,
everyone would need some kind of therapeutic redemption.
In fact, redemption is an image that comes from therapy
(Orlinsky, 1989). [It is remarkable that the etymology of
therapy, from the word therapeúein, “to take care of
something,” in particular, “to take care of a sick person,”
originally meant “to take care of Theus,” of God.] 
With regard to philosophical treatments, in accordance
with practical life philosophies, they have a long tradition
and currently renewed vigor. Tradition goes back to
Hellenistic philosophy. In effect, above all, Hellenistic
philosophy consists of practical ethics, which is identified
with the medical model. Thus, one of its best accounts, such
as probably that of Nussbaum (1994), mentions “Epicurean
surgery” for vane desires, or “Skeptic laxatives” for upsetting
beliefs, and of “Stoic tonics” for disorderly passions. In fact,
well characterized therapies of current psychology such as
Ellis’ rational emotive therapy and Beck’s cognitive therapy
have an acknowledged affiliation with Hellenistic ethics.
Alternatively, Nussbaum (1994) expounds Hellenistic ethics,
assuming their relevance for current world problems.
Regarding the current renewed vigor of philosophical
therapy, to feel this, suffice it to remember some titles of
famous books, such as, for example, More Plato, Less
Prozac, The Consolations of Philosophy, Take it with
Philosophy, The Philosophical Medicine Kit, About the Good
Life, and, finally, the aforementioned Therapy of Desire by
Nussbaum.
The above paragraphs indicate that the current clinical
model is the standardized form adopted by life’s problems
in current society. Precisely because of this, they are practical
forms, but they are not natural forms produced by “internal
dysfunctions” (neurobiological or psychological) like an
illness or entities that were foreign to the clinical culture
(Zachar, 2001, 2003). According to Horwitz (2002), the
“application of this system to the broad range of problems
of psychiatric clients was not a triumph of science over
ideology, but rather a use of the ideology of science to justify
current social practices” (p. 74).
The Aristotelian questions about the material and form
of psychological disorders also lead one to ask who makes
things this way and, even, if all this does not serve some
end. That is, questions about the efficient cause and the final
cause. 
Who Makes Things This Way? 
Assuming that psychological disorders are not natural
forms, it is meaningful to ask who makes them the way they
are. Briefly, the answer points to the patients and the clinical
practitioners. When all is said and done, it is the patients
who have the disorders. However, disorders do not just “crop
up” like weeds. Disorders have, or they end up having, a
certain form, which, in contemporary society, is usually the
standardized clinical form. In this sense, clinicians are also
architects of the disorder. In fact, a disorder takes on the
form required by the clinician in order to treat it in a
practical way, but not its assumed natural form. I do not
mean to say that clinicians invent the disorders. Disorders
are life’s problems that people have. Clinicians help to
provide them with the form they wind up adopting (see
Brown, 1995).
Now then, patients and the clinicians are part of the same
culture and this culture already has a marked clinical
character (medicalization and psychologization of society).
The very term “patient” assumes this condition. That is why
life’s problems are so easily reconciled to the consideration
of nosological descriptions and, eventually, to “mental
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illness.” Although at one time, this psycho-clinical culture
had a psychoanalytical profile, nowadays its profile is
decidedly medicalizing. Not in vain did an historian of
psychiatry (Shorter, 1997) confer the title “From Freud to
Fluoxetine” to the last chapter of his book. In short, blaming
the brain is the tendency (Valenstein, 1998).
On the other hand, this clinical tendency is currently
predominated by the pharmaceutical industry, whose armed
right hand consists of the classification systems. In short,
one would have to go back to the framework of
psychopathology. I only add that the pharmaceutical industry
uses the propaganda to propagate faith in psycho-drugs,
which involves indoctrination in sickness (when all is said
and done, propaganda was invented by the Catholic Church
to propagate faith in its creeds). It is no coincidence that
“make-believes in psychiatry” (van Praag, 1993) is currently
a topic of conversation. This propaganda is aimed directly
at the public even more so than at psychiatrists themselves,
a new phenomenon. Similarly, the propaganda includes
psychiatrists’ “continuous training” and research sponsoring,
in addition to other influences (Valenstein, 1998, chap. 6).
It is therefore hardly surprising that the sponsor of a study
is also the loudest predictor of the efficacy of the drug being
investigated, as a far-reaching review has shown (Freemantle,
Anderon, & Young, 2000).
What End Can Psychological Disorders Have?
It would be tempting to say that disorders have the end
of addressing the interests of the pharmaceutical industry
and, also, of clinicians. However, this is not the issue. The
issue is the meaning that disorders may have for the patients
themselves. In principle, one could say that disorders are
responses to life’s problems and, thus, attempts to solve
them. One would have to point out that a peculiarity of
contemporary society is its low threshold of tolerance and
acceptance of disorders, together with its tendency to view
life’s problems in psychological terms. With regard to this,
it is notable that depression has become the most frequent
way to cope with life’s problems and, thus, it has become
epidemic (Pignarre, 2001). In this way, that part of disorders
that constitute an attempt to solve problems is lost in favor
of medicalization (psychologization), while not discarding
that, sometimes, the remedy is worse than the illness, and
not forgetting that “therapy” helps the solution process. The
so-called evolutionary psychiatry has to do with this.
Implications of such a Radical Restatement
There are three specific implications of a restatement
such as the one presented herein.
1. Unmasking the clinical framework. It has been argued
that the diagnostic categories correspond to the supposed
neuropsychological entities they claim to be. However, they
really correspond to other interests, in particular, to those
that have to do with the legitimization of psychiatry as a
medical specialty. The neuropsychologizing tendency
prevents us from seeing the “social etiology” of disorders
and arriving at the corresponding conclusions (see Pilgrim
& Bentall, 1999, for an overwhelming discussion about
depression, as Bentall, Jackson, & Pilgrim, 1998, had
previously discussed schizophrenia).
2. Vindicating the critical function of psychology.
Psychology and, particularly, a radical restatement (that goes
to the root of things) are in a condition to perform a critical
function. However, this critique must be total and pragmatic
in the above-mentioned sense (see Pérez-Álvarez, Fernández-
Hermida, Fernández-Rodríguez, & Amigo-Vázquez, 2003,
for a discussion of the future task of clinical psychology).
3. Offering alternatives. Aside from the fact that unmasking
and critique can offer a new viewpoint of things (which is
not unimportant), I propose three ideas, ready for practical
application: (a) one idea would be to prepare the patient to
abandon the fight against symptoms. In principle, it is
paradoxical with regard to clinical logic and common sense,
because it breaks the ties with the logic of the medical model.
(b) Another idea is to reorient the patient about life. Instead
of fighting against symptoms, the patient would be oriented
towards valuable goals (values). (c) The third idea would be
to promote whatever is required so that patients will assume
their corresponding responsibility, in the double sense of being
capable of responding with ability to the given circumstances
and becoming responsible for their lives. It is noted that these
ideas are part of the acceptance and commitment therapy
(Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Wilson & Luciano, 2002),
precisely, a therapy of Skinnerian roots. No doubt, the capacity
for self-improvement that one assumes people to have has
been lost when falling into the state of vulnerability fostered
by the current “therapeutic culture” (Furedi, 2004). These
alternatives are simply ideas that are already established in
clinical settings, going back to Alfred Adler, an author
vindicated herein (Pérez-Álvarez, 1996, chap. 2).
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